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RECENT DECISIONS
DiscoveryConflict of LawsExistence of Privilege

Law Determining

Plaintiff instituted suit in California claiming that defendantpublisher had libeled him in a magazine article. The California trial
judge entered an order allowing plaintiff to take the deposition of the
writer of the allegedly libelous article. The deposition was taken in
defendant's New York office. During the deposition the writer refused to disclose the source of his information, claiming that such
information was privileged. The plaintiff petitioned the federal district court in New York to obtain an order requiring the writer to
answer. The court recognized that under the law of California the
disputed matter was privileged but that under the law of New York
no such privilege exists. Held: Although the law and public policy
of the place of the deposition usually determines the existence and
scope of a privilege, where the state in which the trial is being held
has a strong public policy favoring a certain privilege and where the
state in which the deposition is being taken recognizes no such privilege, the law of the place of the trial will govern. Application of
Cepeda, 233 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
Although there has been much controversy and confusion over
the issue in the past,' the most recent decisions are uniform in holding
that the federal courts, when exercising diversity jurisdiction, will
apply the state law in determining the existence of an asserted privilege.' When this rule is followed, as it was in the instant case, serious
conflict of laws questions may be encountered. Often it is necessary
to take a deposition in a state other than the one in which the suit
is pending, and the privileges which are available to a deponent vary
greatly from state to state.' The federal courts are, of course, required
to follow the choice of law rule established by an authoritative state
court decision if one is available,4 but such precedents are, as yet,
relatively few.
'4 Moore, Federal Practice § 26.23[9] (1963); Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity
and Confusion: Privileges in the Federal Court Today, 31 Tul. L. Rev. 101 (1956).
'See e.g., Krizak v. W. C. Brooks & Sons, 320 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1963); Massachusetts
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Brei, 311 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1962); Boyd v. Wrisley, 228 F. Supp. 9
(W.D. Mich. 1964); United States v. Becton Dickerson & Co., 212 F. Supp. 92 (D.N.J.
1962).
'8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2286 (McNaughton Rev. 1961).
4
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
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Most of the courts which have been faced with the problem have
held that in the usual case the law of the state in which the deposition is being taken will be applied.! The holding of the court in the
instant case represents a departure from this rule on public policy
grounds. The court reasoned that since the state in which the suit was
pending had a strong public policy favoring the privilege being invoked by the deponent and since the state where the deposition was
being taken had no policy either opposing or favoring such a privilege, the policy of the state in which the trial was being held should
be recognized and applied. The court felt that this holding had support in the well-established general principle that the law of the
place of the trial governs the admissibility of evidence.!
Although the holding in the instant case may not constitute a substantial precedent for future adjudications, it does deal with a
recurring problem which must be considered in selecting the most
favorable forum for the institution of suit and the taking of
depositions.'
R.B.L.

Constitutional Law
Waiver Conditional

-

Trial by Jury -

Right of

Petitioner, the defendant in a federal mail fraud prosecution, waived
trial by jury. Federal criminal procedure rule 23 (a) 1 allows a nonjury
trial if three conditions are met: (1) waiver by the defendant in
writing, (2) approval by the court and (3) consent of the government. Here the government refused consent, and defendant was tried
by a jury and convicted. He appealed, contending that the Constitution guarantees not only an unconditional right to jury trial but also
an equal right to waive jury trial. Held: The Constitution does not
confer a right upon the accused to elect between a jury and a nonjury trial and rule 23 (a) sets forth a reasonable procedure for waiver
of jury trial. Singer v. United States, 85 Sup. Ct. 783 (1965).

Unconditional right to trial by jury is embedded in this country's
'Palmer v. Fisher, 228 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 965 (1956);
Ex parte Sparrow, 14 F.R.D. 351 (N.D. Ala. 1953); Application of Franklin Washington
Trust Co., I Misc. 2d 697, 148 N.Y.S.2d 731 (Sup. Ct. 1956); but see Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Kaufman, 104 Colo. 13, 87 P.2d 758 (1939).
s 1 Wigmore, Evidence § 5 (3d ed. 1940); Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 597 (1934).
"For a discussion of the problems presented by the principal case, see Comment, 23 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 704 (1956).
'Fed. R. Crim. P. 23 (a).
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organic law,' and it is a right to be interpreted and applied as it was
at common law in this country and in England when the Constitution
was adopted! The Court conceded that there was evidence of optional
jury trial in six of the colonies prior to independence and to a very
limited extent in pre-nineteenth century England." Nevertheless, it
felt that the framers of the Constitution intended not to provide
an option but to insure "a man's right to a jury when he asked for
it." 5 Indeed, early cases and writings seemed to view jury trial as the
only permissible mode in criminal cases.' It was not until 1930, in
Patton v. United States, that the Supreme Court held that jury trial
is a "right of the accused which he can forego at his election."' Patton,
however, did not let down all barriers to waiver by defendants. The
Court emphasized that "the jury... has such a place in our traditions,
that, before any waiver can become effective, the consent of the
government counsel and the sanction of the court must be had, in
addition to the express and intelligent consent of the defendant."'
In the instant case petitioner urged that situations may arise in
which "passion, prejudice" and "public feeling" would render an
impartial jury trial unlikely.' This claim was not considered since in
the trial court petitioner's only stated reason for waiver of the jury
right was to save time. The Court also refused to consider whether
"federal prosecutors would demand a jury trial for an ignoble purpose"" and noted that motion for change of venue1' and voir dire
examination" are available to help a defendant avoid prejudiced
jurors. Expressly left for another day and case is the question
"whether there might be some circumstances where a defendant's
reasons for wanting to be tried by a judge alone are so compelling
that the Government's insistence on trial by jury would result in the
' '13
denial to a defendant of an impartial trial.
R.G.R.
"'The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury .... "
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury .... " U.S. Const. amend. VI.
3Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
" See Griswold, The Historical Development of Waiver of Jury Trial in Criminal Cases,
20 Va. L. Rev. 655 (1934). See also Bond, The Maryland Practice of Trying Criminal Cases
by Judges Alone, Without Juries, 11 A.B.A.J. 699 (1925); Grinnell, To What Extent Is the
Right to Jury Trial Optional in Criminal Cases in Massachusetts?, Mass. L.Q., Aug. 1923,
p. 7.
5 85 Sup. Ct. at 787, quoting from Grinnell, supra note 4, at 33. Italics in original.
'Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 354 (1898).
7281 U.S. 276 (1930).
'Id. at 312.
'85 Sup. Ct. at 791.
o Ibid.
1Fed. R. Crim. P. 21(a).
"UFed. R. Crim. P. 24(a) and (b).
1385 Sup. Ct. at 791.
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Contribution

-

Consent Judgment as Basis for Right

In a previous tort suit, Callihan Interests, Inc., had consented to a
judgment in favor of an injured party. In the instant case Callihan

sought contribution from Duflield, a joint tortfeasor who had not
agreed to the judgment. Duffield contended that a consent judgment,
not being judicially determined, was not within the language of
article 2212;' and, therefore, Callihan was not entitled to contribution.
The trial court granted Duflield's motion for a summary judgment

and Callihan appealed. Held, reversed: Payment of a consent judgment by the defendant gives rise to a right of contribution against

a nonconsenting joint tortfeasor. Callihan Interests, Inc. v. Duffield,
385 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) error ref.

Contribution is a device used to equalize the burden on solvent
joint tortfeasors.' The Texas courts have allowed contribution in

third party actions,' cross actions,4 and separate actions where the contributor was not a party to the first suit.' Essential to an action for

contribution is that the injured party had a cause of action against
the party from whom contribution is sought and that the claim of
the injured party has been fully paid.'
Several prior cases based on unique fact situations have indicated
that a tortfeasor may even obtain contribution after he settles with
the injured party out of court and pays the claim in full.7 Professor
Hodges relied on these cases in stating that out of court settlements

would give rise to a right of contribution.! The instant case supports
his conclusions and represents the first clear holding allowing con-

tribution against either a non-consenting or non-settling joint tortfeasor after a full settlement has been made. Since in the context of
1 "Any person against whom, with one or more others, a judgment is rendered in any
suit on an action arising out of, or based on tort . . . shall, upon payment of said judgment, have a right of action against his co-defendant.
... Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art.
2212 (1964).
'Union Bus Lines v. Byrd, 142 Tex. 257, 177 S.W.2d 774, 776 (1944).
'Lottman v. Cuilla, 288 S.W. 123 (Tex. Comm. App. 1926).
' Goldstein Hat Mfg. Co. v. Cowen, 136 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) error dism.,
judg. cor.
a Union Bus Lines v. Byrd, 142 Tex. 257, 177 S.W.2d 774 (1944).
'Austin Road Co. v. Pope, 147 Tex. 430, 216 S.W.2d 563 (1949); City of Houston v.
Watson, 376 S.W.2d 23 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
'Bradshaw v. Baylor University, 126 Tex. 99, 84 S.W.2d 703 (1935)
(injured party
assigned his cause of action to settling tortfeasor, who in turn sued his joint tortfeasor for
contribution); Westheimer Transfer & Storage Co. v. Houston Bldg. Co., 198 S.W.2d 465
(Tex. Civ. App. 1946) error ref. n.r.e. (settling tortfeasor sued joint tortfeasor for indemnity); Wm. Cameron Co. v. Thompson, 175 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) error
ref. (express contract preserved right of contribution between the joint tortfeasors).
' "One who has paid an injured party and secured a release without action or judgment
may assert contribution or indemnity against his co-tortfeasors." Hodges, Contribution and
Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26 Texas L. Rev. 150, 168 (1947).
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the contribution statute, there is no substantive difference between
a settlement and a consent judgment, it now seems clear that in both
situations contribution will be allowed.
In Palestine Contractors, Inc. v. Perkins,' the supreme court held
that a covenant not to sue given by an injured party to one tortfeasor would reduce the damages recoverable by the injured party
by one-half. Therefore, the instant case and Perkins leave the settling
or consenting joint tortfeasor with an election. He may obtain a
covenant not to sue from the injured party thereby relieving himself from further liability and restricting the injured party to recovering one-half of the compensation for his injuries from the other
tortfeasor, or he may consent to a judgment or settle with the injured
party for the full claim and upon payment of the claim, enforce his
right of contribution against his joint tortfeasor.
G.M.L.

Estate Taxation - Marital Deduction
With a Power of Appointment

-

Life Estate

Decedent's wife was to receive a specified amount per month for
life out of the income or corpus of a testamentary residuary trust
created by her husband's will. In addition, she was given a general
testamentary power of appointment over the entire corpus of the
trust. Plaintiff, the trustee, claimed that all or at least part of the
value of the trust qualified as a marital deduction.1 The trust could
so qualify only if the surviving spouse was entitled to (1) all of
the income from the trust, or (2) the income from a "specific portion" of the trust. The government contended that the wife's right
to receive a fixed sum did not qualify under either of these criteria.
The plaintiff asserted that the wife's right to a fixed sum did constitute income from a specific portion of the trust, the value of which
could be computed actuarially. Held: Plaintiff may take as a marital
deduction the value of that portion of the total trust corpus which
"368

S.W.2d 764 (Tex. 1964).

1

Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056(b)(5). This section provides, in part: "In the case
of an interest in property passing from the decedent, if his surviving spouse is entitled for
life to all the income from the entire interest, or all the income from a specific portion
thereof, payable annually or at more frequent intervals, with power in the surviving spouse
to appoint the entire interest, or such specific portion . . . the interest or such portion

thereof so passing shall . . . be considered as passing to the surviving spouse. ...

"
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would yield the amount of income to which the surviving spouse was
entitled. Northeastern PennsylvaniaNat'l Bank C9 Trust Co. v. United
States, 235 F. Supp. 941 (M.D. Pa. 1964) (appeal pending 3d Cir.).
The Internal Revenue Code does not define what constitutes a
"specific portion" of a trust corpus, but the Treasury Regulations
define it as a "fractional or percentile share of a property interest."'
This restrictive definition was disapproved by the Second Circuit in
Gelb v. Commissioner.' In Gelb, a determinable portion of the trust
corpus was given to the decedent's daughter for her support and
education. The surviving spouse was entitled to all of the trust income
and had the sole power to appoint all of the trust corpus except the
portion which would be paid to the daughter. The court held that the
value of the daughter's interest could be computed actuarially and
carved out of the trust corpus, thereby leaving the widow a specific
portion of the trust corpus which would qualify for the marital
deduction.
In the instant case, the issue presented was the converse of that
in Gelb. Here, the wife had a power of appointment over the entire
corpus but a right to only a fixed sum of the trust income. A portion
of the trust corpus, the value of which would yield a fixed sum, was
carved out of the total trust principal and held to qualify for the
deduction. The holding in this case, if upheld and followed, establishes that a "specific portion" includes not only an interest in the
corpus which will yield a stated fractional or percentile share of the
income, but also embraces an interest in the corpus of a trust which
may be computed actuarially to yield a stated dollar amount of income
to the wife.
The impact of this broadened definition of "specific portion" on
the availability of the marital deduction is significant. If the wife is
granted a general power of appointment over the entire or a determinable portion of the corpus of the trust and is given a right to
any of the income from the trust, the estate of the decedent will be
allowed to claim a marital deduction for the portion of the corpus
which will yield the income to which the wife is entitled up to a
maximum of the amount of corpus over which the appointment
power is granted. Both the amount of the corpus over which the wife
has a general power of appointment and the amount of the corpus
which will yield the wife's income right will be allowed to be computed actuarially. Under these rules the estate planner may grant
the spouse a certain dollar amount payable out of income and corpus,
2Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(c)
3298 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1962).

(1964).
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thereby insuring payment of the stated amount if the trust income
is low and at the same time providing for accumulation if trust income exceeds the amount of the income right of the wife, while still
retaining the maximum benefits of the marital deduction.
R.B.L.
G.M.L.

Habeas Corpus Remedies

Federal Prisoners -

Exhaustion of

Appellant was convicted of importation and concealment of heroin
and of failure to register and pay the special tax thereon. He did
not appeal. Later, he sought federal habeas corpus relief under section
2255 of the Judicial Code,1 alleging that his being forced to take an
emetic that caused him to regurgitate heroin which he had swallowed
subjected him to compulsory self-incrimination in violation of the
fifth amendment.' The district court ruled against appellant on the
merits, finding that he had voluntarily swallowed the emetic upon
a physician's advice that harm could result to him from the heroin.
On appeal, appellant raised the additional contentions of illegal arrest,
detention and search and seizure. Held: Under section 2255, (1) The
failure of a federal prisoner to appeal from his conviction does not
automatically foreclose habeas corpus relief, (2) Fay v. Noia3 and
Johnson v. Zerbst furnish the controlling standard in waiver situations for federal prisoners seeking post-conviction relief, and (3)
a federal prisoner seeking habeas corpus relief must demonstrate that
he has not waived his contentions by deliberately failing to appeal
from his original conviction. Nash v. United States, 342 F.2d 366
(5th Cir. 1965).
Section 2255 governs federal prisoners seeking habeas corpus relief.
Prior to the instant decision, the general rule regarding convictions
obtained in the federal courts, as stated in Sunal v. Large,' was that
the writ of habeas corpus would not be allowed to do service for an
appeal. An analogous situation existed concerning state prisoners
'28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958).

'U.S.
3372
4304
5 332

Const. amend. V.
U.S. 391 (1963), noted in 18 Sw. L.J. 475 (1964).
U.S. 458 (1938).
U.S. 174 (1947).
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applying for federal habeas corpus. Section 22540 requires the state
prisoner to exhaust his state remedies before seeking federal habeas
relief; and, until the decision in Fay v. Noia, the federal courts frequently denied relief to a state prisoner who failed to appeal his state
court conviction on the ground that he had not exhausted his state
remedies. 7 Fay held that the limitation in section 2254 applied only
to remedies presently available to the prisoner, and that a prior failure
to appeal did not bar federal habeas corpus relief. But the Court in
Fay also held that the writ could be denied on the ground of waiver
when it was shown that the defendant had deliberately bypassed the
state appeal procedures. Johnson v. Zerbst was held to furnish the
controlling definition of waiver-"an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege."8
In the instant decision, the court reasoned that the remedy should
not be more liberal for state prisoners than for federal prisoners and
extended the deliberate bypass test to federal prisoners by reading an
implied mitigation of the holding in Sunal v. Large into the Supreme
Court's opinion in Fay v. Noia. Thus, if the federal prisoner can
affirmatively show that "he has not waived his .. .contentions by
deliberately failing to appeal from his original conviction,"' a federal
district court will inquire into the question of whether the errors
alleged are properly cognizable in a section 2255 proceeding. Finally,
if he meets these prerequisites, the court will proceed to the merits
of his claim.
In the instant case, the court did not state appellant's reason for
his failure to appeal and did not indicate what facts would constitute
a deliberate failure to appeal, but denied him relief on the ground
that he failed to meet his burden of proving that he had not waived
his contentions under the Johnson v. Zerbst standard. Nonetheless,
the decision is significant in that it establishes a more efficacious collateral remedy for federal prisoners in the future.
J.P.F.

e28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1958).
'See, e.g., Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950).
8304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
9342 F.2d at 367.
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Insurance - Forfeiture for Breach of Covenant Against
Change of Title or Interest - Conveyance to Controlled Corporation
Plaintiff was the sole owner of a building insured by the defendant
under a Texas standard fire insurance policy. The defendant insurance
company also insured fixtures and machinery in a building owned
by a partnership consisting of the plaintiff and his two sons. Both
policies provided that the insurance company would not be liable for
any loss occurring "following a change in ownership of the insured
property." On March 11, 1963, the plaintiff transferred the building,
and the partnership transferred the fixtures and machinery, to a corporation. The plaintiff received 66.25 per cent of the stock and the
remainder went to his sons. The day after the transfers the insured
property was destroyed by fire. The plaintiff instituted suit to recover
for his loss under the two policies. The defendant moved for a summary judgment claiming that it was not liable because there had
been a change in ownership. Held: A transfer of insured property
to a controlled corporation is such a change in ownership as will
enable the fire insurer to avoid liability on the policy. Weisfeld v.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 236 F. Supp. 496 (S.D. Tex. 1964).
Fire insurance is issued to a particular person. The insurance company must consider not only the risk of the property being destroyed
by fire, but also the character of the owner and his desire to protect
the property. Since the question of ownership is material to the risk,
a fire insurance contract is considered personal and not in rem.' The
covenant against change in ownership is a standard one and is construed strictly against the issuer because it involves a forfeiture.'
Under Texas law, to come within the provision, the change of ownership must be one which will either increase the motive to destroy or
diminish the desire to protect the insured property.' If the change of
title or interest does not meet this test, the insurer may not take

advantage of this clause. Examples of transfers which will not effect
a forfeiture include interspousal transfers' and transfers to an agent
for the purpose of selling the property.
The question of whether a transfer to a controlled corporation is
1National Fire Ins. Co. v. Carter, 257 S.W. 531 (Tex. Comm. App. 1924).
'Lowe v. Michigan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 236 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
'Insurance Co. of America v. O'Bannon, 109 Tex. 281, 206 S.W. 814 (1918); National
Fire4 Ins. Co. v. Carter, 257 S.W. 531 (Tex. Comm. App. 1924).
Mercury Fire Ins. Co. v. Dunaway, 74 S.W.2d 418 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) error ref.;
British General Ins. Co. v. Stamps, 57 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
a Walters v. Century Lloyds Ins. Co., 154 Tex. 30, 273 S.W.2d 66 (1954).
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recognized as a change in ownership had not previously been considered in Texas. In a New Jersey case, the court held that a transfer
of insured property to a wholly owned corporation would be a breach
of the covenant! The reasoning in that case was that the corporation is a distinct legal entity and that the owner's interest in the
property is not equivalent to a sole shareholder's interest in the same
assets in the hands of the corporation. Also, the court pointed out,
if a transfer to a solely owned corporation were not condemned immediately, at what point in time, if the sole shareholder were to divest
himself of some of the corporate stock, would the covenant against
transfer of title come into operation?
The instant case does not hold that a transfer to a wholly owned
corporation would act as a forfeiture. Here, there was no doubt that
the plaintiff's 66.25 per cent stock interest was a significant change
in ownership from his sole ownership of the building and his partnership interest in the fixtures and the machinery. The court's reasoning
in this case is in line with similar Texas authorities' and should provide an excellent stepping stone to the holding that even a transfer
to a wholly owned corporation constitutes a breach of the covenant
against a change in ownership when that case should arise.
G.M.L.

Labor Law

National Labor Relations Act - Layoff
of Employees Resulting From Employer's Unfair Labor
Practice
-

Various employers, in response to a strike by the union of one
chain of retail stores, locked out their store employees. As a result of
the lockout the work load of the service employees in other departments was substantially decreased, and the employers were forced to
layoff certain of these employees for financial reasons. The union
petitioned the NLRB claiming that the lockout and the resultant
layoffs constituted unfair labor practices under sections 8 (a) (1 ) and
8 (a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act.' The Board held in
favor of the union on both contentions' and petitioned the court of
3White v. Evans, 117 N.J. Eq. 1, 174 AtI. 731 (Ct. Err. & App. 1934).
7 E.g., cases cited supra notes 1-5.
149 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) and (a)(3)
2 145 N.L.R.B. 361 (1963).

(1958).
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appeals for enforcement of its order. Held, enforcement granted in
part and denied in part: Discharging employees due to a decreased
work load does not constitute an unfair labor practice even though
the decreased work load is the foreseeable result of the commission of
an unfair labor practice by the employer. NLRB v. Great A. &¢ P.
Tea Co., 340 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1965).
It was admitted by the employers for the purpose of appeal that
the locking out of the store employees under the conditions here presented was an unfair labor practice. The employer's main contention
was that the Board had erred in holding that the consequential layoffs of other employees also constituted an unfair labor practice. The
Board, on the other hand, contended that since the layoffs were the
foreseeable result of the unlawful lockout the employees should be
held to have discouraged wrongfully the service employees from
union membership.' The court rejected the Board's contention on two
grounds. First, an essential requisite to the commission of an unfair
labor practice under section 8 (a) (3) is that the employer's motive
in committing a certain act be to encourage or discourage membership in a labor organization.4 The court in the instant case found that
although the employer may have reasonably foreseen that the lockout
would cause the layoffs, this did not of itself establish the essential
improper motive. The court, after pointing out that the Board had
stipulated that the layoffs were due solely to the lack of work and
were entirely unrelated to the participation of the employees in union
activities, held that the motive to discourage union membership would
not be implied merely because the employers committed an act
which constituted an unfair labor practice in relation to some union
employees even though it would foreseeably result in the discharge of
other union employees.' Secondly, the court also found that the Board
had not produced any direct evidence tending to show that the layoff of the service employees actually had the effect of discouraging
future union activities. The Board's contention that this effect was
the only reasonable conclusion which could be made from the facts
was rejected.
The reasoning of the court on the motivation issue is supported
549 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. 5 158(a) (3) (1958): "It shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer . . . by discrimination in regard to . . . tenure of
employment . . . to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization."
4
NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963); Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961).
a The court recognized that in some cases the motive to discourage union membership
will be presumed but held that such a presumption would be indulged in only where the
practice of the employer was of a type to be inherently discriminatory which was not the
case here. See e.g., Radio Officer's Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
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by the Third Circuit's opinion in Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n v.
NLRB,' which was decided after the Board's decision in the instant
case. Considering the great significance which the foreseeability rule
could have upon labor law if adopted, the time would seem ripe for
a determination of this issue by the Supreme Court.
R.B.L.

Oil and Gas - Field Allowables - Acre-Feet/Surface
Acres as Basis
The Fairway (James Lime) field is located in a single structure;
the oil-bearing stratum is slightly elevated in the center where it is
thickest and tapers off to thinner sections at the edge. The spacing
unit for the field is 160 acres per well, and no small tracts are present.
The Railroad Commission's most recent order prorating the field
allowable among the wells in the field was based fifty per cent on
the surface acreage assigned to each well and fifty per cent on the
number of acre-feet of productive sand underneath the surface
acreage of each well. Appellant, whose wells are located in the thick,
center portion of the reservoir, appealed from the Commission's
order, contending that it discriminated against landowners having
the most oil in place under their tracts. Appellees presented expert
witnesses who expressed the opinion that, because of water encroachment at the edges of the reservoir and lower pressure at the center
of the structure, oil would drain from the thin sections at the edges
toward the thick section in the center. Held: The Railroad Commission's order for an allowable based fifty per cent on surface acreage
and fifty per cent on acre-feet of producing sand was reasonably supported by substantial evidence where there was expert testimony that,
as the oil is removed, the wells favored by the formula will suffer
drainage by the wells not so favored. Pickens v. Railroad Comm'n,
387 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. 1965).
Beginning in 1961, three iconoclastic decisions1 have divorced Texas
from formulas tied to a per-well factor in prorating oil and gas pro6 330 F.2d 492 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local
1242 v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 833, 841 (1964).
'Railroad Comm'n v. Shell Oil Co., 380 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. 1964); Halbouty v. Railroad
Comm'n, 163 Tex. 417, 357 S.W.2d 364 (1962); Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n,
162 Tex. 274, 346 S.W.2d 801 (1961).
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duction among the tracts in a field. The proposition that the small
tract owner has a "property right" in reserves underlying large tracts
to the extent necessary to yield a profit to the small tract owner has
been rejected. Pickens indicates that these decisions did not end field
proration problems.
In the previous cases, the formulas were struck down because they
failed to afford each producer "an opportunity to produce his fair
share of the minerals in the reservoir."' After the first two decisions,
the Railroad Commission entered new orders allocating production in
the Normanna Field on the basis of surface acres' and in the Port
Acres Field on the basis of acre-feet of productive sand.4 In the instant
case, Pickens urged that only a formula based one hundred per cent
on an acre-feet basis would afford him a fair opportunity to recover
the minerals underlying his tracts. The expert witnesses were in
agreement that the productive sand was thick in the middle (115
feet) and thin (fifteen feet) at the edges of the structure, creating
wide discrepancies between the amount of the reserves underlying the
various tracts. The disagreement was over whether there would be
migration of oil from the thin, outer sections toward the thick, inner
section. Five of the six witnesses testified they foresaw such movement based on their belief that (1) the formation is surrounded by
water which is in contact with the oil so that, as the oil is withdrawn,
the water moves in, pushing the oil updip toward the thicker, center
section and (2) the pressure is lower in the center of the field than
around the edges, and oil drains toward low pressure. Because of
"voluminous" testimony on these points, the court had no difficulty
in finding that the Commission's order was supported by substantial
evidence.
Theoretically, the rule of law applied in this case is no different
from the three preceding cases: proration among wells is to be aimed
at affording each landowner a reasonable opportunity to recover his
fair share of the minerals. Pickens, however, indicates that, given the
fugitive nature of oil and gas, if drainage within the field is foreseeable, a suggested proration formula based solely on the estimated
in-place reserves under each tract at the time of the hearing will meet
with disapproval by the Commission. To offset the effect of prospective migration and the rule of capture, the formula in such a
2387 S.W.2d at 42.

'Special Order No. 2-46673, Tex. R.R.
G.R. 885 (1961).
"Special Order No. 3-51035, Tex. R.R.
'At the time of the hearing before the
duction had agreed upon and recommended
timately adopted.

Comm'n Rules & Regs.

7 at 917, 14 0. &

Comm'n Rules & Regs. 5 4 at 585 (1963).
Commission, owners of 88% of the field's proto the Commission the formula which was ul-
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case will be weighted in favor of tracts expected to suffer drainage
to the extent necessary to compensate for the drainage.
R.G.R.

Procedure

-

Time Limit for Appeal

-

Requirements

for Extension by Agreement
An employee obtained a judgment for $90,000 on June 26 against
the defendant railroad company for personal injuries. An amended
motion for a new trial was filed on July 22. On August 19, the
parties entered into and filed with the court clerk a written agreement which, under the provisions of rule 329b,' prevented the defendant's motion for a new trial from being overruled as a matter
of law on September 6. The agreement extended the date on which
the trial court's determination could be made to September 23. The
parties, at the request of the trial judge, orally agreed while in court
on September 22, to extend the period eight additional days to
September 30. This oral agreement was transcribed by the court
reporter but was not filed with the court clerk until December 27.
The trial court overruled the defendant's motion for a new trial
on September 30. The defendant filed the trial court record in the
court of civil appeals on November 27.' After the court of civil
appeals affirmed, the plaintiff contested the defendant's appeal to
the supreme court by alleging that it had no jurisdiction of the case
since the defendant's appeal to the court of civil appeals had not
been timely. Held, appeal dismissed: To effect an extension of the
time in which a court must adjudicate a motion for a new trial,
the parties must enter a written agreement and the agreement must
be filed with the court clerk within forty-five days after the motion
for a new trial is made. Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Arnold, 388 S.W.2d
181 (Tex. 1965).
Rule 329b-3 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure' permits a
period of forty-five days from the filing date of the original or
1 Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b-3.

'The losing party in the trial court has sixty days from the date on which a judgment
not requiring a motion for a new trial is rendered or from the date a motion for a new
trial is overruled by order of the judge or by operation of law in which to file the record
in the court of civil appeals. Tex. R. Civ. P. 386. The sixty day period ends in this case
either on November 29, if the period began to run when the judge overruled the defendant's
motion for a new trial, or on November 22, if the period began to run on the expiration
date of the first extension.
aTex. R. Civ. P. 329b-3.
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amended motion for new trial within which all such motions must
be determined. If a determination is not made within this period, the
motion is overruled by operation of law unless the parties have
agreed within that period to extend the period to a definite date not
more than ninety days after the filing of the last motion for a new
trial. The section requires the extension to be effected by filing a
written agreement with the clerk of the trial court.
The defendant in the principal case alleged that in determining
whether the second extension was valid, rule 329b-3 should be considered in context with Rule II."Rule 11 provides that no agreement
made by the parties in connection with a pending suit will be enforced unless it is either in writing and filed as part of the court
record or made in open court and entered in the court record. The
court decided that even if the rules were construed together the
provisions of Rule 11 allowing an agreement to be made in open
court could not be held to modify the specific restrictions of Rule
329b-3. The court then proceeded to hold the agreement made in
the instant case invalid on two grounds. First, it held that the oral
agreement between the parties, although transcribed into the court
record, was not a "written agreement" within the meaning of the
rule. To qualify under the rule, the agreement must be a separately
drawn and executed document. Secondly, the agreement was invalid
because it had not been properly filed with the clerk; rule 329b-3
was amended in 1961 to provide specifically for such filing. The
court stated: "One seeking to determine the status of a pending
appeal or a clerk who must determine whether an appeal is timely
taken, should find his answers in the documents: that are timely on
file in the clerk's office, and not in the untranscribed notes of the
court reporter."' Thus, the court held that to be effective the agreement not only had to be made within forty-five days after the motion
for a new trial but also must be filed with the clerk within that
period.
This decision illustrates the degree of strictness which the supreme
court uses in interpreting the various rules concerning time limits for
appeal. The parties in the instant suit were merely accommodating
the judge by agreeing orally in open court to a second extension.
The court holds, however, that regardless of the cause of the deficiency or the facts involved, an agreement extending the period in
4 Tex. R. Civ. P. 11.
5 388 S.W.2d at 184.
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which a motion for a new trial may be decided must precisely adhere
to the provisions of rule 329b-3.6

J.w.c.

Real Property

-

Five-Year Statute of Limitations

Quitclaim Deed
Respondent brought a trespass to try title suit to recover title and
possession of land situated in Randall County, Texas. Respondent
alleged title by adverse possession and pleaded both the five' and
ten -year statutes of limitations. The trial court found for respondent
on both the five and ten-year statutes. The court of civil appeals
affirmed the judgment below on the basis of the five-year statute.'
Held, reversed: Respondent failed to establish title under the fiveyear statute because a quitclaim deed is insufficient to constitute a
"deed or deeds" under that statute. Porter v. Wilson, 389 S.W.2d
650 (Tex.1965).
In Cunningham v. Frandtzen' the supreme court expressed the
reasons for having several statutes of limitations fixing varying
lengths of time required to gain title by adverse possession. "In fixing
the different periods of limitation in our statute, the legislature regulated the force and effect to be given to adverse possession of land by
the degree of merits in the title under which it was held and claimed,
requiring the longer possession in proportion to the weakness of the
" The trial judge attempted to remedy the ineffective oral extension agreement by use
of a nunc pro tunc order. He signed the order on September 29 and ordered the clerk
to file it as of September 22, the day before the first extension expired. The supreme
court rejected this attempt saying: "A judge's order which fails to meet the requirements
for a written agreement signed by the parties and which is not timely filed with the clerk
is not a compliance with Rule 329b." 388 S.W.2d at 185.
A dissenting opinion by Justice Greenhill points out the seeming inequity in the decision.
"It is shocking to me that this gentlemen's agreement, made in open court, at the request
and order of the court, should not be binding. I would construe Rule 11 with Rule 329b
and would hold that the record was filed in time." 388 S.W.2d at 186.
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5509 (1958), providing that:
Every suit to recover real estate as against a person having peaceable and
adverse possession thereof, cultivating, using or enjoying the same, and paying
taxes thereon, if any, and claiming under a deed or deeds duly registered,
shall be instituted within five years next after cause of action shall have
accrued, and not afterward.
'Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5510 (1958), providing a ten-year statute of limitations for actions brought to dispossess adverse possessors holding no recorded deed.
3371 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
426 Tex. 34 (1861).
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title."' To have sufficient merit to succeed under the five-year statute
an adverse possessor must claim under a "deed or deeds duly registered." It had been previously asserted that Parker v. Newberry' and
Rosborough v. Cook" supported the position that a quitclaim deed
was sufficient to qualify the holder under the five-year statute.8 The
court here considered the Rosborougb and Parker decisions and held
that neither constituted valid authority for that position. Rosborougb
held that in order to support a limitations title under the five-year
statute it is not necessary that the deed under which the claim is made
actually convey any title. The court in the instant case held that
while that proposition may be accepted as valid, it could not be extended to uphold the contention that the deed need not at least purport to convey title. In Parker, the court stated, "The essential
requisites of a deed necessary as the foundation of the plea are, that
it shall, 'by its own terms, or with such aids as the law authorizes,
assume or purport to operate as a conveyance.' "' The instant decision
interprets this to mean a conveyance of the land. As the court pointed
out, a quitclaim deed purports to convey only the interest in the land
held by the grantor and, therefore, fails to meet the requirement of
a supposed conveyance of the land itself.
The holding in the principal case establishes that, although a possessor may have received no actual title to the land whatever, if he
is claiming under a deed which purports to convey the full title to
the land to him he may establish good title to the land described in
the deed by five-years adverse possession. If, on the other hand, the
deed which he holds purports to convey only the grantor's "right,
title and interest" in the land, he will be treated as an ordinary adverse possessor with no deed and required to prove ten-years adverse
possession to establish good title. The court made it clear that merely
because the words "quitclaim" or "right, title and interest" are used
in the granting clause of a deed does not necessarily mean that the
deed is a quitclaim deed. The court stated that whether a deed purports to convey the land or only the grantor's interest in the land
must be determined from the instrument "as a whole."'"
J.M.w.
'Id. at 40.

083 Tex. 428, 18 S.W. 815 (1892).
7108 Tex. 364, 194 S.W. 131 (1917).

8Larson, Limitations On Actions For Real Property: The Texas Five-Year Statute, 18
Sw. L.J. 385 (1964).
'Parker v. Newberry, 83 Tex. 428, 430, 18 S.W. 815, 816 (1892).
10389 S.W.2d at 654. See also Cook v. Smith, 107 Tex. 119, 174 S.W. 1094 (1915);
Benskin v. Barksdale, 246 S.W. 360 (Tex. Comm. App. 1923).

